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RESPONDING TO THE ISDS LEGITIMACY CRISIS BY WAY OF
MEDIATION: IMPLICATIONS FROM CEPA'S DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISM
Shu Shang*
1.

INTRODUCTION

Although the investor-state dispute settlement ("ISDS") mechanism is a relatively
new phenomenon in the field of international investment law, the system has attracted as
much as attention as criticism. ' Critics have argued that this system is procedurally
illegitimate and substantively ineffective, deserving serious reforms and maybe even a total
abandonment. 2
The distrust of the ISDS system has long embedded Chinese history. Fighting
against imperialists on the issue has intensified with the recent surge of nationalists under its
current President Xi Jinping. s Chinese scholars have consistently demanded the reexamination of ISDS and the state continues to innovate its domestic law while making
available non-adjudicative dispute resolution mechanisms to foreign investors.
In the recently concluded Investment Chapter of the Mainland China and Hong
Kong Closer Economic Partnership Agreement ("CEPA"), a five-alternative dispute
resolution mechanism has been jointly agreed upon by the Ministry of Commerce of
thePeople's Republic of China ("MOFCOM") and the Trade and Industry Department
("TID") of Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The dispute
resolution mechanism was created to resolve claims between Hong Kong investors and
Mainland government agencies, or claims between Mainland investors and the Hong Kong
government in the Special Administrative Region.
Interestingly in the proposed chapter, arbitration has not been included as one of the
8
methods to resolve investor claims against state government agencies. Instead, mediation
9
was proposed and included. Based on a thorough examination of the CEPA investment
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Pomona) College of Business. The author would like to thank participants of conference on "Dispute
Resolution in Asia and Beyond: Progress and Trend" in City University of Hong Kong for their comments on
an earlier draft of the paper. The research was supported by the People's Republic of China Ministry of
Education Humanities and Social Science Project (Youth Scholars), "Investor Facilitation and Protection in the
Shanghai Free Trade Zone (14YJC820040) and the author thanks Lanxin Zhu and Sophiane Ben Ali for their
research assistance.
M.R. Dahlan & Wolfvon Kumberg, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Reconceptualized: Regulation of
Disputes, StandardsandMediation, 18 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L. J. 467, 468 (2017).
2 Id

4 Dilini Pathirana, A Look into China's Slowly Increasing Appearance in ISDS Cases, INVESTMENT TREATY
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2017/09/26/a-look-into-chinas-slowly-increasing-appearance-

in-isds-cases-dilini-pathirana/.
5Id.

id.
Mainlandand Hong Kong CloserEconomic PartnershipArrangement, TRADE AND INDUSTRY DEPT., art. 20
4
(June 28, 2017) https://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepallegaltext/cepal 15 note.html (Ch.) [hereinafter CEPA].
Id
9 Id.
6
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mediation mechanism, this article argues that such design has deeper implications and should
be seen as China's pragmatic response to the current ISDS legitimacy crisis.o If investment
mediation is designed properly, it may better equip China to raise less contentious dispute
resolution mechanisms in its ongoing BIT negotiations with the United States and the EU.
In this Article, part II examines the advantages of mediation as an alternative to the
current ISDS scheme; part III provides a general framework of dispute settlement mechanism
used in different generation of China's BIT, analyzing China's general willingness to agree to
interest-based approaches of resolving disputes involving the Chinese state; part IV analyzes
the recently concluded CEPA dispute resolution mechanism and argues that the current
system has its merits; and part V concludes by suggesting that a well-designed investor-state
mediation mechanism is the pragmatic response China has to the current ISDS legitimacy
crisis and may impact China's strategy to negotiate a reformed dispute settlement mechanism
in its upcoming investment treaty talks.
H.

MEDIATING INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES: THE CURRENT
STATUS
A.

Problems in Investor-State Arbitration

Although investment arbitration was designed to rectify old time problems, being
called "gunboat diplomacy," the increasing number of investors trying to access the forum
over the past two decades has started revealing the system's weaknesses." Attackers to the
ISDS's foundations argue that the system itself causes friction with international
constitutional law principles such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights.16 As for
practicality, frequent users of ISDS are also concerned with the system's expenses, delays,
and political challenges.' 7 Investors complain about the cost and slow pace of the process, as
well as that the annulment process has made their tribunal-granted rights much less certain.' 8
States complain that the process favors investors and has produced an expansive
application of bilateral investment treaties ("BITs"), thus harming the interests of capital
importing states' civil society.
Scholars lament at the lack of consistency and legal
coherency of the jurisprudence, and NGOs criticize the process for lacking transparency and
premising the rights of investors over other important interests.20 The unsatisfactory remarks
made by the CEO of the American Corporation, Metalclad, after the company was awarded a
USD $4 million by an investment tribunal is often used as an example that investor-state
arbitration may not be an optimal way of settling treaty disputes, even for winners.21 Since
the current investment arbitration system relies on states' voluntary compliance with awards,
10 Id.

IS See 0. Thomas Johnson Jr. & Jonathan Gimblett, From Gunboats to BITs: The Evolution of Modern
InternationalInvestment Law, Y.B. ON INT'L INV. L. AND POL'Y 649 (2010-2011).
16 See generally
Stephan W. Schill, Reforming Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS): Conceptual
FrameworkandOptionsfor the Way Forward,20 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 649 (July 7, 2017).
" See id at 670.
18 Id
9
20

Tim R. Samples, Winning and Losing in Investor-StateDispute Settlement, 56 A. Bus. L. J. (Feb. 26, 2019).
Jack J. Coe, Towards a Complementary Use of Conciliation in Investor-State Disputes - A Preliminary

Sketch, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. OF INT'L L.
21 See id.
at 8.

AND POL'Y

7 (2005).
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even when they are adverse, states' direct refusal to abide by arbitral awards or withdrawal
from the system are strong obstacles to the integrity of the system.
Along with those criticisms, scholars raise the problem that today's ISDS system
design might rest on the right-based system itself with Professor Nancy Welsh pointing to
surveys that indicate that "the greatest obstacle to a negotiated settlement is that host state
governments don't want to be seen to be voluntarily accepting liability for any kind of breach,
22
However, under modem dispute
rather than having liability imposed by a third party."
design theories, the best system should include an interest-based process, and parties should
.21
begin with that process, looping forward and backward among available processes.
B.

Proposing Mediation as an Alternative

Among several reforming proposals, including the EU's efforts to establish a
permanent investment court under the proposed TTIP's investment chapter, adding mediation
24
into the context of ISDS remains popular. UNCTAD has recently made efforts in exploring
alternatives to arbitration, although it has failed to mention an actual plan of
implementation. 2 5 The TBA published its rules on investor-state mediation in 2012.6 Many
treaty negotiators have also considered the possibility of including mediation in free trade
agreements and BITs, including, but not limited to CETA, TPP, and some countries' model
BITs.27 Lower costs and higher efficiencies aside, non-adjudicative dispute resolutions are
particularly attractive in the investor-state context for other significant reasons.28
Primarily, interest-based approaches might work better when one side of the dispute
is a state. Since mediation allows parties to retain almost complete autonomy, integrating
mediation into the investment treaty context would provide investors and states with the
opportunity to resolve their disputes through a process that provides for explicit consideration
21
With
of each other's interests, rather than eliminating the consideration of their rights.
this
mediation,
during
and
negotiation
parties directly participating in the communication
the
at
are
issues
legal
less
as
manner
in
a
fairer
method has the potential of resolving disputes
to
us
urges
also
theory
prevention
dispute
of
core of the discussion. The gradual development
a
or
generate
disputes,
of
escalation
the
reconsider procedures and systems that could prevent
conciliation
addition,
In
investor.
and
wholly new relationship between the host government
2 Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into Bilateral
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. J. 71, 94 (July 29, 2013). See also William Ury et al., Getting
Disputes Resolved: Designing Systems to Cut the Costs ofConflict (Nov. 25, 1988).
23

id.

24 Dahlan & Kumberg, supra note 1.
25 Caitlin Cottingham, Assessing the Current Syatem - Systemic Issues, 13-16 in Investor-State Disputes:
Prevention andAlternatives to Arbitration,U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Mar. 29, 2010),

http://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf.
26 See Anna Joubin-Bret

et al., International Bar Association Mediation Committee State Mediation
2012),
4,
(Oct.
ASSOCIATION
BAR

INTERNATIONAL

Subcommittee

2

https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Documents/process/IBA%20Rules%20for`/o Olnvestor2
State%20Mediation%20(Approved%20by/o201BA%2OCouncil%204%200ct/o20 012).pdf.
See

27

e.g.,

Investment

Policy

HUB,

INVESTMENT

POLICY

UPHOLD,

https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/lIA/CountryBits/207/ (last visited May 16, 2019).
28

Id.

29

Coe, supra note 20, at 19-20.
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and mediation will add confidentiality and privacy to parties, minimizing the negative impacts
of inconsistent awards in later relationships.
A revival of studies starting in the 1980s, inspired by original studies and national
laws in jurisdictions with less sophisticated legal systems, investigate the resolving of
commercial and business disputes through mediation mechanisms. 30 A number of the world's
renowned arbitral institutions responded to the rising needs of parties by adding mediation to
their institutional rules. 31 For example, the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC")
made conciliation available under its rules to facilitate the amicable settlement of disputes,
and reference to such rules in the event of a contractual dispute between parties can be
established by the inclusion of a mediation clause or reference to the Rules. 32 The conciliator
is given a broad power to conduct the conciliation process in the way that they deem fit. 3
The ICC Conciliation Rules were replaced by the 2001 Amicable Dispute Resolution Rules
and, by 2014, replaced by Mediation Rules which reflected modem day practices by
providing users with clear instructions for the conduct of the proceeding while maintaining
necessary flexibility. 34 The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules are more detailed, and can be
used if there is an acceptance by one party of an invitation to conciliate, without the need of
having a specific agreement readily signed before the dispute arises. 35
ICSID included conciliation rules since the organization's inception and in
accordance with the Rules, negotiations may be conducted before or after the investor began
arbitration. 6 Overall the ICSID Rule of Conciliation have been invoked six times.37 One of
the few published accounts concerns the first conciliation conducted under the ICSID Rules
between Tesoro Petroleum Corporation and the State of Trinidad and Tobago by Lord
Wilberforce. 3 8 In that dispute a retired English judge successfully acted as a conciliator to
help resolve a dispute involving the distribution of $143 million US dollars in profits. 3 9 Since
then the use of conciliation has been routinely recommended by the ICSID Secretariat for
disputants, and the ICSID Secretariat also suggested that it be easier for parties to access
conciliation. 40 A significant number of parties settled using the ICSID arbitration
proceedings, approximately 30%.41
As a general rule, in order to invoke mediation mechanisms in the context of
investor-state disputes, the choice of mediation needs to be at least visible to disputants.
See M.L. Marasinghe, The Use of Conciliation for Dispute Settlement: The Sri Lanka Experience,
29 THE
INT'L AND CoMP L. Q. 398-414 (Apr.- Jul. 1980).
30

3' See, e.g., Arbitration Clause, INT'L CHAMBER OF COM. CONCILIATION RuLES, https://iccwbo.org/dispute-

resolution-services/arbitration/arbitration-clause/ (last visited May 16, 2019).
32 Id.
33 Id
34 Mediation Rules, INT'L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (Jan. 2014), https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolutionservices/mediation/mediation-rules/.
3s See United Nations Commissions on International Trade Law Conciliation Rules, UNCITRAL, (July 23,
1980), www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/arbitration/1980Conciliation rules.html.
36 See Overview of Conciliation under ICSID Convention, INT'L CENTER FOR SETTLEMENT
DIsPUTES,

https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/process/CSID-Convention-Conciliation.aspx (last visited May 16, 2019).
37

See

List

of

Concluded

Cases,

INT'L

CENTER

FOR

https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/ConcludedCases.aspx?status=c
38
Id.
39

SETTLEMENT

OF

INV.

DISPUTES,

(last visited May 16, 2019).

See List of Concluded Cases, supra note 37. See also Coe, supra note 20, at 12.

40 id.

4 Coe, supra note 20, at 35
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Mediation in dispute resolution in international investment treaties ("IITs") and as part of the
national foreign investment legal framework, are two major areas parties can invoke in the
context of investment protection options.
1.

Mediation in IITs

International investment treaties and free trade agreements have long considered the
42
Most treaties contain
possibility of including less contentious forms of dispute settlement.
references to non-adjudicative dispute resolution by providing clauses containing a "cooling
43
Article VII of the USoff' period to allow for amicable settlement between parties.
Argentina BIT states, "The parties to the dispute shall initially seek to resolve the dispute by
consultations and negotiations. If the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or
Because these
company concerned may choose to submit the dispute for resolution...
treaties do not specifically mention mediation, nor specify how negotiations and consultations
shall be conducted, language triggering cooling off periods have been subject to inconsistent
45
For example, it has been suggested that the United
interpretations by investment tribunals.
States government would accept requests by foreign investors during this "cooling-off' period
to negotiate or mediate.4
Later generations of BITs go beyond traditional cooling off periods to express needs
or wishes for non-binding, third party procedures. For example, Article 23 of the 2012
United States Model BIT provides, "in the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and
the respondent shall initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation,
47
Other investment
which may include the use of non-binding, third party procedures."
treaties take a further step to specifically refer to ICSID conciliation proceedings, usually as
48
an alternative to arbitration under the ICSID or UNCITRAL arbitration rules. A number of
treaties concluded by the Netherlands and China have envisioned formal conciliation as an
9
alternative to arbitration. 4 The Netherlands - Uganda BIT in Article 9 has mentioned that
"[e]ach Contracting Party hereby consents to submit any legal dispute arising between the
Contracting Party concerning an investment of that investor in the territory of the former
Contracting Party to the ICSID for settlement by conciliation or arbitration under the ICSID
See generally Stephan W. Schill, The Multilateralizationof Investment Law: Emergence of a Multilateral
System ofInvestment Protectionon Bilateral Grounds, 2 TRADE, L. & DEv. 1 (2010).
43 See Treaty Between the United States of America and the Argentine Republic Concerning the Reciprocal
Encouragementand ProtectionofInvestment, INVESTMENT CLAIMS, art. VII (Nov. 14, 1991).
42

SId.
45 See RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW, 248-49

(Oxford 2d ed., 2008).
4 Id.
47 U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment,
2012, art. 23.
4
See generally Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State ArbitrationRevised: A CriticalAnalysis of the Revisions and
ProposedReforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13:4 L; AND Bus. REV. OF THE AMERICAS
885, 888-89 (2007).
See also New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement Ch. 11, art. 152 (2008),
Id. at 902.
49

https://www.mfat.govt.nz/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/china-fta/nz-china-ftaresources.
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Convention." 50 In the recently concluded China-New Zealand FTA, the investment chapter
also provides a mechanism for the compulsory settlement of disputes between foreign
investors and the country where the investment is made." Only if a dispute cannot be settled
within six months through consultation and negotiation, is the investor able to submit the
issue to conciliation or arbitration by the ICSID, and in that scenario conciliation has been
expressly referred to as the alternative dispute resolution mechanism to arbitration. 52
Some other investment treaties tend to allow states to play a more active role. An
example of such a treaty is the BIT concluded between China and Botswana, Article 13(c) of
which specifically calls for the two contracting parties to meet to resolve investment
disputes. 53 Although instances of parties invoking such state-to-state consultation provisions
are rare, state parties are known to consult in the early stages at least in some disputes. This
option illustrates that certain states have been amenable to taking on a more active role in
investment disputes between their nationals and host states.
2.

Mediation in National Law Responding Mechanisms

The development of mediation under national laws has also been seen as an
important propellant for the acceptance of early settlement or negotiation in investment
treaties. Some states have created procedures in their domestic laws and court systems that
allow for measures to encourage early evaluation and resolution of potential investor
complaints. 54 Peru established a state-run centralized coordination system that collects
information from investors of disputes which may be escalating into investor-state
arbitrations.'" The country passed its Response System Law No. 28,933, which has the object
of creating a "coordinated response system" to investment disputes in an attempt to resolve
such disputes by negotiation and mediation wherever possible.
The Response System Law
has created a Special Commission to represent the state in international investment dispute
settlement proceedings, which analyzes each case, determines the feasibility of an amicable
resolution, and conducts negotiations for resolution.1 7 The Responsive System was thought to
be a preventive mechanism of Peru's ISDS mechanism, and the Special Commission was
assigned to the Ministry of Economy and Finance to represents Peru in any pending ISDS or
ADR procedure, which is delegated by the central government to negotiate and mediate.
Columbia has also adopted a very similar system in its law. 59 Columbia has appointed a
5

Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Uganda and the Kingdom of the

Netherlands, Netherlands-Uganda, at art. 9 (2000).
51 New Zealand-China Free Trade Agreement, at art. 152 (2008).
52 Id. at art. 153(3).
53 See Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Botswana and the Government of the People's
Republic of China, at art. 13(c) (2000).
5
See generally Best Practice in Investment for Development: How to Prevent and Manage Investor-States
Disputes:
Lessons
from
Peru,
UNITED
NATIONS,
19-33
(Nov.
2011)
https://unctad.org/en/Docs/webdiaepcb20l 1 d9en.pdf.

55 Id.
56

Id

" See id at 29.
58

5

Id.
Magrete Stevens & Ben Love, Investor-State Mediation: Observations on the Role of Institutions, in

CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INT'L ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 389 (Arthur W.

Rovine ed., 2009).
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centralized domestic authority to coordinate the communication between foreign investors
and different branches of the Columbian government. 6 In Columbia, a lead agency has been
created to gather and report information to the proper government agency for preliminary
analysis, and to facilitate discussions and early settlement if potential disputes arise between
61
Others, including Korea and
the investor and agencies of the Columbian government.
China, have also established ways for foreign investors to join dialogues with state
62
departments in times of disputes.
However, perceptions of national quasi-mediation systems are not always that
positive. Totally state-run programs are likely to be perceived as unfair and subject to
political influence of the government by foreign investors. 63 If foreign investors are
possessed with the idea that agency official quasi-mediators as biased against them, or are
insufficiently open-minded, they are very unlikely to first go through state-run quasimediation when disputes arise." Confidentiality of these proceedings may add to further
suspicion of outside parties.

M.
A.

APPLYING INVESTOR-STATE MEDIATION TO CHINA
Resolving Investor-State Disputes - China's Treaty Practices

China occupies an important position on the international investment map. China
has benefited from foreign investment since the 1990s, and has gradually become one of the
61
world's largest economic powers in terms of size and impact of its outbound investment.
The country is not unfamiliar with investment treaty terms. Since it signed its first BIT with
66
It has also concluded
Sweden in 1982, it has signed more than 150 BITs as of today.
decade with its major
last
the
numerous free trade agreements with investment chapters in
in
the ASEAN region,
countries
and
trading partners including Australia, Iceland, Norway,
with the China-Korea-Japan FTA awaiting ratification.

60
61
62

Id
See Welsh, supranote 22, at 117-18.
Coe supra 20, at 8.

See Paulus Tangke & Abdul Hamid Habbe, Effect of Political Connection and Foreign Ownership to
Corporate Sustainability through Corporate Governance as a Mediation, 2:3 QUALITATIVE AND
QUANTITATIVE RES. REV. 70, 73 (2017). In general, political connections can be explained as a situation where
63

in a business or company there are political people who have closeness with politicians.
See generally id. at 96-97.
See China Foreign Direct Investment, TRADING ECONOMICS, https://tradingeconomics.com/china/foreigndirect-investment, see also Daniel H. Rosen & Thilo Hanemann, The Rise in Chinese Overseas Investment and
What It Meansfor American Businesses, CHINA BUS. REv. (Jul. 1, 2012).
6

65

6 See generally China's foreign-invested bilateral investment agreement list Bilateral Investment Theaty,
2012),
12,
(Dec.
LAW
AND
OF TREATY
DEP'T
OF THE CHINA
OF COM.
MINISTRY

http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/Nocategory/201111/20111107819474.shtml.
67 See generally Fourteenth Round of Negotiation on a Free Trade Agreement among Japan, China and the
Republic

of

Korea,

MINISTRY

OF

FOREIGN

AFF.

OF

JAPAN

(Dec.

7,

2018),

https://www.mofa.go.jp/ecm/ep/page23e000337.html.
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It is now generally agreed that Chinese BIT practices have been broadly
characterized into three different phases.6 ' Taken as a whole, major differences in wordings
can also be found in dispute resolution clauses written into three generations' investment
treaties. In the first generation of China's BITs (investment treaties signed before 1998),
China has generally removed the tooth of investment treaties by blocking foreign investors
from suing the government in international tribunals.69 This has been explained by scholars
as a phenomenon of "bilateral sovereignty", which is making it difficult for any third party to
decide on issues that should be resolved within the arms' length of two countries. 70 In the
second period, since the signing of the China-Barbados BIT, included in the first investorstate arbitration mechanism voluntarily submitted to by the Chinese state, China tried to sign
open BITs with developing countries that have a more intimate trading relationship with
China.n Signing treaties with these countries in Africa, Middle Asia, Central and Eastern
Europe, and Latin America pose less risks to China because it is quite unlikely that China will
appear as respondents in international investment law claims brought up by investors of those
nationalities. 72 During the third wave of BIT signing practices, China mostly experimented
with more developed countries, and these BITs were generally concluded after 2002.73 After
signing a BIT with Germany in 2003, China signed eight more BITs with developed nations
in less than two years.7 4 One of the more mature BITs signed during the third era was the
China-Canada BIT, which has been proclaimed as reaching a balance between investment
protection and maintenance of China's domestic legal order. 76
Later Chinese BITs have included comprehensive investor-state arbitration
procedures, generally characterized as setting high procedural bars for investors to bring
claims against China.7 7 Usually, they contain provisions regulating the pre-arbitration stage
of dispute resolution.
In the first case brought by a foreign investor against the Chinese
state under the Rules of ICSID Convention, Ekran Berhad v. China, a Malaysian construction
company brought claims against China but subsequently withdrew the case.
The only

See, e.g. Axel Berger, China's new bilateral investment treaty programme: Substance, rational and
implications for international investment law making, 12 AMERICAN SOC. OF INT'L L. 4-10 (2008),
https://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/Berger-ChineseBITs.pdf
68

69

Id. at 4.

Amos Irwin, Crossing the Ocean by Feeling for the BITs: Investor-State Arbitration in China's Bilateral
Investment
Treaties,
3
GLOBAL
ECON.
GOVERNANCE
INITIATIVE
1,
28
(2014),
http://www.bu.edu/pardee/files/2014/05/ChinaE2%80%99s-Bilateral-Investment-Treaties-WorkingPaper.pdf.
71 Berger, supra note 68, at 10.
70

72

id

7 Id at 10.
74 Idat 11.
7 Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China for
the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, Nov. 24, 2016 . The agreement is a BIT, but it is
called the Foreign Investment Protection Agreement [hereinafter FIPA].
76 Canada-ChinaForeignInvestment Promotion and ProtectionAgreement (FlPA), Gov'T OF CANADA PRESS

RELEASE (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.canada.ca/en/news/archive/2012/02/canada-china-foreign-investmentpromotion-protection-agreement-fipa-.html.
n Berger, supra note 68, at 13.
78 id.

7 Julian G. Ku, Enforcement of ICSID Awards in People'sRepublic of China, 6(1) CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 31,
37 (2013).
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investor-state case up to date where China acted as a Respondent was the 2017 case Ansung
Housing Co. Ltd. v. People's Republic of China, which was brought under the ChinaRepublic of Korea BIT 8' The case was dismissed on the statutory limitation grounds in
accordance with Article 9(7) of the China-Korea BIT, which says "an investor may not make
a claim... if more than three years have elapsed from the date on which the investor first
acquired, or should have first acquired, knowledge that the investor had incurred loss or
damage." 81
In addition, China has also shown its position denying the "back door" available to
investors from using the Most Favored Nation ("MFN") standard as a vehicle to gain access
82
to investor-state claims under China's earlier BITs. In the often discussed Tza Yap Shum v
The Republic of Peru case, which involved one of China's first generation BITs - the ChinaPeru Free Trade Agreement, a Hong Kong investor filed suit against the Republic of Peru for
83
breaching its treaty obligations by expropriating the company's assets in Peru. One of the
questions for the tribunal was to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear claims arising
under the expropriation clause of the China-Peru FTA, because the treaty says that only
claims concerning "the amount of compensation for expropriation" maybe submitted to an
ISA. 8 4 It has been generally observed that after cases such as RosInvest Co. U.K. Ltd., v. the
86
Russian Federation8 5 and European Media Ventures v. Czech Republic, some ISA tribunals
If the MFN
started to allow for a more expansive interpretation of MFN clauses in BITs.
from that
investors
clause accords the same protection to an investor from a BIT partner state,
state can enjoy the protection accorded to investors from a different partner state based on
88
BITs containing more favorable clauses.
China is quite concerned with this expansion of ISA powers because of the
significant number of BITs the state entered into that provide for MFN treatments, as such
kind of interpretation is likely to open the floodgates for future investment claims against
China in arbitral forums.89 This is particularly pertinent to the right of an investor to bring an
ISA claim, rather than be forced to exhaust local remedies under an ISA restricted BIT.90
Therefore, in Tza Chinese government tried to assist Peru in its defense and argued against its
91
own citizen to prevent the tribunal from hearing this dispute. The country even sent one of
See Michael Patrini, Ansung Housing Co., Ltd. V. People's Republic of China, GLOBAL LEGAL CHRONICLE
(Apr. 6, 2017), www.globallegalchronicle.com/ansung-housing-co-ltd-v-peoples-republic-of-china/.
81 Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Republic
of Korea on the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Sep. 7, 2007, at art. 16.
' Ku, supra note 79, at 36
8 See Senor Tza Yap Shum v. The Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 2015, Objections to
Jurisdiction and Competence.
" Id. See also King Fung (Dicky) Tsang, Chinese BilateralJudgment Enforcement Treaties, 40 LOY. L. A.
INT'L & COMi. L. REv. 1 (2017).
85 See RosInvest Co. U.K. Ltd., v. The Russian Federation, Case No. V079/2005 (2013).
8o

86 Irwin, supranote 70, at 17.

87 See Playing by the Tribunals' Rules: A Solution for Resolving the Conflict Between Rules and Practicein

IA Interpretation,J. OF INT'L L., http://pennjil.com/playing-by-the-tribunals-rules-a-solution-for-resolving-theconflict-between-rules-and-practice-in-iia-interpretation/.
88 Id.
89 See Ku, supranote 79, at 36.

9 Playing by the Tribunals'Rules,supra note 87.
91 Tza Yap Shum, supra note 83.
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the original negotiators of the BIT, Mr. Fan Jianghong, to testify in front of the tribunal that
China had intended this clause to prevent international arbitrators from deciding whether or
not a state had expropriated a given investor's assets.
However, by citing both to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and
earlier cases, the tribunal disagreed with the Chinese state's own interpretation of the treaty. 93
By allowing a more expansive interpretation of the China-Peru BIT, it also considered the
significance of the China-Peru BIT's "fork-in-the-road" clause by stating that otherwise any
investor who sued the state for expropriation in local courts would be shut off from
subsequent investor-state arbitration proceedings. 94 China has expressed its extreme
95
dissatisfaction after the decision was rendered, and Peru has then filed to annul the decision.
Subsequently China also responded specifically to Tza by trying to expressly block this
strategy in later signed BITs.9
B.

The Development of Domestic Investor-State Mediation Mechanisms in China

Different from arbitration, which is seen in China as a foreign originated product,
mediation has always been a key form of dispute resolution method in China.97 The
popularity of mediation in China was oftentimes associated with the value of harmony that is
not only central to the Chinese Confucian philosophy, but also to the controlling methods of
the Communist Chinese government since early days of the People's Republic of China.9 8
China has a long tradition of favoring mediation. 9 As a mean of dispute
settlement, mediation survived from the Pre-Qin Period to the Ming and Qing periods.'o
Although court reform in many parts of urban China has decreased the volume of mediation
cases, there has been a revival interest of developing ADR in recent years, probably as a
result of the explosion of caseloads in the courts of many parts of China. ot To Chinese
parties, mediation is less disruptive and better at saving face because it does not simply label
one party as "right" or "wrong" after the mediation proceeding, and sometimes could lead to
better off results for both disputing parties.102
Mediation carried out in the arbitration proceeding is also commonly accepted by
the Chinese. 10 3 It has long been the practice of the China International Economic and Trade
Commission ("CIETAC"), one of the most prominent arbitral institutions in China that has

9 Chen An, Queries to the Recent ICSID Decision on JurisdictionUpon the Case of Tza Yap Shum v. Republic
ofPeru, 10 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 6, 861 (2009).
93 Tza Yap Shu, supra note 83.
94 id.

9 See John Adam, Ad Hoc Committee Takes Expansive View On Jurisdiction in Peru, INT'L ARB.
NEwSLETTER (Jul. 2015), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/international-arbitration-newsletter-57784/.
9 See Ku, supra note 79, at 32.
9 See Danny McFadden, Resolving Disputes in China using Mediation, Bus. DIsPuTEs IN CHINA (Sept. 2011).
98 Id.
9 Lian Hong, Harmonious Concept of Confucianism and Chinese TraditionalMediation System, 18 CHANG
CHUN U. OF SCI. & TECH. 89 (2005).
100 Id.
'01 See e.g., Randall Peerenhoom & Xin He, Dispute Resolution in China:Patterns, Causes and Prognosis, 4
EAST ASIA L. REV. 1 (2009).
102

id

103 McFadden, supra note 97.
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the capacity to deal with cross-border disputes, to combine mediation with arbitration in
resolving disputes. 104 Although CIETAC can independently handle mediation cases, it is
more common for parties to see mediation occurring as part of the arbitration process, in a
process called the "med-arb".'os Article 45 of the CIETAC Rules of Arbitration of 2012
makes general provisions covering med-arb practices and outcomes, along with a few other
institutions. 16
Outside China, the conception of arbitrators mediating is controversial, usually
because it leads to party disclosures during mediation proceedings that would ordinarily not
be disclosed during arbitration proceedings. 10 The flexibility of mediation has allowed
Chinese dispute resolvers to incorporate it into the entire dispute resolution proceeding in a
more casual manner.' 0 For example, in a 2014 Hong Kong Court of Appeal case, Gao Hai
Yan v. Kenneye Holding Ltd, the Court recognized the legitimacy of a mediation proceedings
taken place ex parte and over a dinner table in the Mainland, considering that such casual
09
proceeding is not uncommon in China and is generally accepted by Chinese legal cultures.
, Actually, non-adjudicative methods of resolving investor disputes against the state
0
Under a so-called
are always available to foreign investors doing business in China."
"administrative reconsideration process (xing zhengfu yi)," the investor-applicant can initiate
a complaint by applying to the same level of government, higher level of government, or an
administrative body, that has failed to act."' The applicant may also claim for administrative
compensation while asking for administrative reconsideration. 112 Different levels of
governments have also established complaint centers, mediation panels, and other forms of
working panels to facilitate non-judicial means of resolving disputes with foreign investors,
without the need of invoking external mechanism such as treaty arbitration. 113
This state-managed practice has undergone some further developments in the recent
wave of responding to the deepening of the "open door" policy and simplifying administrative
4
procedures for foreign investors in order to improve accessibility to foreign investment."
MOFCOM encouraged the use of mediation by having promulgated a special Interim

See Tanya Kozak, International Commercial Arbitration/Mediation at CIETAC (China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission), CANADIAN FORUM ON Civ. Jus. (1998), https://cfcjfcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/hosted/17451-international-commercial_arb.pdf.
10 Wang Guiguo & He Xiaoli, Mediation andInternationalInvestment: A Chinese Perspective, 65 MAINE L.
REV. 216 (2012).
1o6 See CHINA INT'L ECON AND TRADE ARB. COMMISSION AB. RULES, art. 45 (2012).
107
See
Mediation vs
Arbitration Which
is
Best?,
NONDISCLOSUREAGREEMENT,
https://nondisclosureagreement.com/mediation-vs-arbitration.htm (last visited May 16, 2019).
104

108 OPPOSING THE ENFORCEMENT OF PRC ARBITRAL A WARD ON PUBLIC POLICY GROUND? NOT AS EASY AS YOu

THINKI ONC LAWYERS (2014), http://www.onc.hk/enUS/opposing-the-enforcement-of-prc-arbitral-award-onpublic-policy-ground-not-as-easy-as-you-think/?print=print.
109 Gao Haiyan v Keeneye Holdings- Court of Appeal DMC/arbn/12/02 H.K.C. 335 (Dec. 2, 2011).
no0 Berger, supra note 68.
131 Id
112
113

id
id.

11' See Recent Policy Developments and Key Issues Chapter III, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT (2014),
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationChapters/wir2Ol4ch3en.pdf
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Measure in 2006, the Interim Measures on Complaints from Foreign-Related Enterprises
("Interim Measures"). 115
In the newly passed Peoples Republic of China Foreign Investment Law 2019,
Article 26 has been specially set out to explore means that help to resolve disputes between
foreign investors and agents of governments, by preparing to establish a National Complaint
Coordination Mechanism to coordinate all complaints filed by investors. 116 Although the
structure of the coordination mechanism has not been fully described by the law , a literal
reading of the statute may suggest that the drafters have been contemplating disputes between
foreign investors and local governments to be resolved in non-adjudicative manners including
complaints, negotiation or mediation."'
C.

A Discussion of the Emerging Investor-Sate Mediation Mechanism Under
CEPA

CEPA is an economic agreement between the Government of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic
of China, signed on 29 June 2003. 1'9 A similar agreement, known as the Mainland and
Macau Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement, was signed between the Government of
the Macau Special Administrative Region and the Central People's Government on October
18 , 2003. 10 Due to the specific political arrangement between China and its Special
Administrative Regions, CEPA is functionally equivalent to a free trade agreement between
21
Mainland China and Hong Kong (or Macau).1
Hong Kong has long had the reputation of being the region's major financial
services centerl22 and also enjoys a relatively independent legal system compared to Mainland
China, where political manipulation of the judiciary is acquiescent. 12 Hong Kong is an
important FDI destination for Chinese investors 1 24 , and it is often used by Mainland investors
as an ideal transitory exit point of their capital, before engaging in larger scale investment

11

See. Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors,

MINISTRY

OF

COMMERCE

PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC

OF

CHINA,

(Aug.

10,

2006)

http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045825.shtml.
116 Foreign Investment Law of the People's Republic of China, USCBC, at art. 26, (Mar. 15, 2019),
https://www.uschina.org/sites/default/files/foreigninvestment-law-of thepeoples republic ofchina_unofficial translation.pdf.
"' See Changes in China's Policy on Attracting Foreign Investment After WTO Entry, BusINEss ALERTCHINA (Jul. 15, 2000), http://info.hktdc.com/alert/cba-eOO07f.htm.
"' TRADE AND INDUSTRY DEPT, supra note 7.
120 Jiaxiang Hu, Closer Integration, ControversialRules: Issues
Arising From the CEPA between Mainland
China, Hong Kong, and Macao, 18 PACE INT'L L. REv. 369, 369-70 (Fall 2006).
121 id.
122 See Huw Jones & David Goodman, Hong Kong named top financialcenterfor
second year, REUTERS (Oct.
31, 2012), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-financialcentres-wef-report-idUSBRE89U)BD20121031.
123
Rebecca
Liao,
Judicial Reform
in
China, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
(Feb.
2,
2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-02-02/judicial-reform-china.
124 See Hong Kong Foreign Direct investment, TRADING ECONOMICS,
https://tradingeconomics.com/hongkong/foreign-direct-investment. See also Johan Nylander, Hong Kong Overtakes The U.S. In FDI, FORBES
(2015),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jnylander/2015/06/25/hong-kong-overtakes-the-u-s-infdi/#2508831346ee.
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125
Towards the end of 2016, Hong Kong remained a region that
projects in foreign countries.
attracted the biggest volume of Chinese outbound investment, receiving a 58.2% of total
outbound investment from Chinese investors, far exceeding the volume received by Chinese
investor's second biggest outbound investment destination, the United States.126
As early as late 1970s, Hong Kong investors started to actively invest in Mainland
China.127 According to MOFCOM statistics, Hong Kong investors tend to focus on areas
including real estate, manufacturing, leasing and commercial services, which are areas that
28
have longer development traditions in Hong Kong.1
Lately, CEPA's Investment Chapter was concluded in June 2017. 129 As an
amendment to the original CEPA, the purpose of signing an investment chapter was mainly to
deepen economic and technical collaboration between mainland China and Hong Kong, as
well as to "provide for promotion and protection of increasing investments between the two
places."1 3 0 As an essential part of the investment protection measure, CEPA investment
chapter's full-fledged dispute settlement mechanism is quite notable. Article 19 of the
investment chapter gives very specific guidelines on how investors of one side can initiate a
claim of the government agency on the other side. "'
On the other hand, like other dispute settlement mechanisms inserted into
investment treaties, CPEA's dispute settlement mechanism has a broad jurisdiction. 132
According to Article 19, any dispute arising from an alleged breach of substantive obligations
of the Chapter could be submitted to the said dispute settlement mechanism. 113 Possible
violation of relevant chapters under the treaty could concern the minimum treatment, most
favored nation treatment, national treatment, admission of high executives, expropriation,
compensation, and transfer. 13 4 However, arbitration is not available as a dispute resolution
choice. 135
Instead, the suggested list of dispute settlement methods is exhaustive and contains
amicable negotiation, complaints to local authority, dispute resolution by the investment
commission established under the treaty, mediation, and judicial reliefs. 136 A more detailed
CEPA "Eligibility Criteria for Designation as Mediator" (the "Criteria") guideline was then
passed by the Hong Kong Department of Justice ("DOJ"), which proposed that three member
committees to be established to handle possible request of investor-state mediation when

125

Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Capitalflows into and out ofHong Kong SAR: implicationsfor monetary

andfinancialstability, 44 FIN. GLOBALIZATION AND EMERGING MKT. CAP. FLOws 207 (2008).
126

Takuma Yatsui, Hong Kong Increasing its Presence as Springboardfor Chinese Companies to Go Global,

Mrrsul

&

Co.

GLOBAL

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

(2018),

https://mitsui.com/mgssi/en/report/detail/1226111_10744.html.
127

id

128

Economic and Trade Exchanges Between China and Macao in 2016, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE'S

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2017), http://tga.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zwyw/zs/201710/20171002657260.shtml.
129 TRADE AND INDUSTRY DEPT, supra note 7, at art. 20.
130 Id. at art. 3.
131 Id. at art. 19.
132 id.
133 Id
134 id.
133 id.
136 id.
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disputes arise.13 7 Pursuant to the Criteria, each party will have the opportunity to nominate
one mediator, with the third candidate is to be proposed by the government appointed
mediation institution if parties cannot agree with the third candidate's candidacy. 138
Nationalities of proposed mediators are not set by the Criteria.339
In general, at least five distinctive features of the CEPA mediation mechanism are
worth some additional thoughts and are discussed in detail in the following section.
1.

Relationship with Other Dispute Resolution Mechanism

Unlike some other proposals of incorporating mediation into treaty dispute
resolution mechanisms, which usually envision a series of steps from negotiation to
arbitration with mediation being considered as a "gap filler," CEPA's mediation mechanism
are stand-alone and in an alternative form of other dispute settlement mechanism.1 4 0 The
advantage of such design is to allow investors a wide range of non-mutually exclusive
choices. By not including arbitration, the mechanism makes direct complaints handling and
judicial means equally available to investors, allowing coordination between governments and
courts taking part during the dispute resolution process. 14 Gradually, if investors perceive
some dispute settlement mechanisms to be systematically weaker than other means, they will
be less likely to invoke them and the system itself can filter out less successful mechanisms,
leaving the government with better guidance when drafting amendments.
Therefore, by having mediation as one of the five paralleled dispute resolution
settlements available for Hong Kong and Mainland China investors, the design has the
potential of combhting against people's existing suspicion towards mediation.1 4 2 On the other
side of the spectrum, if investors end up prefer litigating, they will still have their day in
court, avoiding uncertainties caused by usual "fork-in-the-road" clause.1 4 3
2.

Quality of Proceedings

The quality of dispute resolution always depends on the adjudicators.'" Given the
flexibility of mediation proceedings, mediation is arguably not necessarily amendable to
procedural fairness, at least not at the level of court proceedings or arbitration. CEPA and
governments following implementation guidelines also do not regulate the style that the
mediator conducts their mediation proceedings. 14 The mediator may, of his or her own

'37

See Government of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, Report of the Working Group on

Mediation
Executive
Summary,
DEPT.
https://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/public/pdf/2010/med20100208e.pdf.
138 id.
139

id

'

See e.g., Welsh & Schneider, supra note 22, at 3-19.

141

OF

JUSTICE

(Feb.

2010),

Government of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, supra note 137.

See Tangke & Habbe, supra note 63.
See Senor Tza Yap Shum, supra note 83.
'4
See Honorable Mr. Justice Fung, Mediator's Qualifications and Skills, MEDIATION CONFERENCE 2014
(Mar. 21, 2014), https://mediation.judiciary.hk/en/doc/Mediator%20Qualifications%20and%2Skills.pdf
145 Id. at
13.
142

143
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initiative, or on the request of parties, at any stage of the proceeding and from time to time,
and for the consideration of the parties, help generate options or draft settlement proposals. 146
At its inception, the CEPA rules of mediation learned from the ICSID Rules of
Conciliation by giving parties the default choice of a three-member mediation committee or
47
However, other literature
panel, which is likely to help ensure the impartiality of tribunals.1
roles are rather
mediators'
also suggests that in interest-based dispute resolution mechanisms,
Therefore, the
148
to help both sides to internalize conflicts and facilitate communications.
The beauty
efficiency.
or
added number of mediators will not necessarily add to impartiality
that will
person
added
it
is
an
of mediation does not lie in the added third-party's expertise,
change the dynamic between the two conflicting sides.
3.

Privacy of Proceedings

Unlike judicial proceedings or investor-state arbitrations, which are usually subject
to transparency requirements, mediation proceedings under the newly designed CEPA
mediation mechanism and, are private and confidential. 149 Jurisprudential growth of
investment law is worrisome to China, because it is likely that the state will be held
responsible for something it did not know that it has agreed to back in earlier years. "o
For example, the MFN clause interpretation in the Tza case has disappointed
5
Chinese state and Chinese scholars for quite some time.' ' In general, the Chinese state is
more likely to embrace the privacy of mediation proceedings, as if a particular case turns to
be not in their favor, at least the case itself will not have binding effects on future
interpretations.
4.

Enforceability

One obstacle of investor-state mediation is that many commentators have surmised
is that it will lack of an enforcement mechanism akin to that provided for in the 1958 New
York Convention or the ICSID Convention. 152 -As Eric van Ginkel remarked, "If the
settlement were to provide for monetary consideration in favor of the investor, the investor
would have no better assurance for the State to recognize. At that point, the State will fulfill
its obligations under the settlement agreement when the State entered into the investment
agreement." 153 This concern remains valid and has inspired at least one prominent

146

147

Id. at 6-8.
Government of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, supra note 137.

Fung, supranote

144, at 6-8.
See TRADE AND INDUSTRY DEPT, supra note 7, at preamble.
'5o See AFP Beijing, China'sparliament takes up new foreign investment law, AL ARABIYA (Mar. 8, 2019),
English.alarabiya.net/en/business/economy/2019/03/08/China-s-parliament-takes-up-new-foreign-investmentlaw.html.
151 See Shen Wei, Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, 108 THE AM. J. OF INT'L L. 315, 319 (Apr. 2014).
152 Stevens & Love, supra note 59.
153 Id.
148

149

231

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2019

15

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 7
THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss & LAW

practitioner to remark in confidence about the "pointlessness" of formal investor-state
conciliation processes. 154
However, it must not be ignored that in a majority of cases, parties are prone to
honor voluntary settlement agreements. 15' Therefore, unlike an arbitration proceeding, a
mandatory enforcement mechanism might not need to be the mediation norm. Although
enforcement is not certain under the current CEPA provision, the non-compliance cost for
both sides are high and any side's non-compliance with the settlement agreement is likely to
harm the long term economic relationship between the two regions, which is less tolerable to
the Chinese government.15
Under the current arrangement and according to Article 4 of the ITD Guideline,
"[i]nvestors can apply for enforcement of a mediation settlement agreement in accordance
with relevant laws and regulations of the side where the investment is made." 1 57 If the
investment takes place on the mainland side, Hong Kong investors actually have the option of
asking the court to honor the validity of a mediation settlement.'s
Even though that the
transition between CEPA mediation and court proceedings have not be clearly laid out yet,
procedural safeguards in the Chinese courts add to an additional protective layer of
enforcement. 19
5.

Political Considerations

One key argument against investor-state mediation is that in dispute resolution
proceedings states usually operate quite differently from investors. 1 60 Developing countries,
like China, face political pressures if they give in to foreign investors too easily because
Western countries were once portrayed as "imperial" in the. unpleasant past. One recent
example comes from the ongoing U.S. - China trade war, during which propaganda campaign
escalated in China, and major Chinese state media tried hard to portray Chinese negotiating
officials as strong and non-yielding, and the Trump administration as unreasonable and
161

162

bullying. Overall, the pressures on state parties to settling claims are quite high.
Usually
government agencies involved in the dispute require a legislative act or direct approval from
another government agency to enter into a settlement, or to make a payment on a

154

Aravind Ganesh, Cooling Off Period (Investment Arbitration), (7 MAX
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PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR INT'L,
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Nov.
2017),

https://www.mpi.lu/fileadmin/mpi/medien/research/MPEiPro/CoolingOffPeriodsEiProSample Entry.pdf.
. See Enforcement of Mediation Settlement Agreements in China, JONES DAY COMMENTARIES (Oct. 2002),
https://www.jonesday.com/Enforcement-of-Mediation-Settlement-Agreements-in-China-1 1-05-2002/.
156 TRADE AND INDUSTRY DEPT, supra note
7.
1s7 Id. at art. 4.
158 Id.

'
See China's Judicial System: People's Courts, Procuratorates, and Public Security, OLEMISS,
https://olemiss.edu/courses/pol324/chnjudic.htm (last visited May 16, 2019).
160 See Dahlan & Kumberg, supra note 1, at 3.
161 Chinese State Media Touts "5,000 Years of Trials and Tribulations,"
Gearing Up For a Long Trade War,
CNBC, (May 14 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/14/chinese-media-pushes-propaganda-campaign-astrade-war-fight-escalates.html
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settlement. 163 Where an agency has the authority to enter into the settlement, internal
1 64
The Egyptian
struggles over which agency is responsible for the settlement can arise.
Prime Minister's rejection of a $10 million negotiated settlement in favor of arbitration
proceedings in SPP v. Egypt is often cited as an example by scholars to elaborate political
pressures faced by a state in times of crisis.'
Although the obstacle also exists in China, this is less of a concern under the current
CEPA regime. First, Hong Kong or Macau investors, although are treated as "foreign" under
some Chinese law provisions and therefore are sometimes afforded preferential rights, are not
perceived foreign in eyes of Chinese citizens. 166 Second, it has been suggested that the
complexity of state bureaucracies can be overcome by centralizing the state negotiating
authority, or using a mediation process involving multiple stakeholders (citizen interests
groups, for example).
CEPA's scheme seems to model after the former , by designing a centralized
authority as the responsive authority at each side, largely reduces political pressures that will
prevent agencies directly responsible from mediating disputes. Since the very officials whose
actions will be assessed do not directly participate in the mediation, this system design could
more effectively balance the needs of resolving problems and addressing political realities. In
addition, the confidential nature of the mediation process itself will help take the pressure off
more politically motivated patriotic groups.
IV.

A PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION: IS MEDIATION CHINA'S
PRAGMATIC RESPONSE TO THE ISDS LEGITIMACY CRISIS?

20 years passed since Jack Coe's seminal article Towards a Complementary Use of
Conciliationin Investor-State Disputes, and many efforts of promoting the use of conciliation
or mediation to resolve investor-state disputes have been either delayed or proven futile.
Major reform proposals of incorporating investor-state mediation in existing treaty dispute
settlement mechanisms include making minor changes to current model BITs and requiring
Theoretical
mandatory conciliation as part of the whole dispute resolution process.
high
include
designer,
considerations aside, some of the main barriers, as seen by the system
investment
and
trade
multilateral
BIT renegotiating costs, failure in the negotiation of newer
agreements including the TPP, unprecedented numbers of pending investor-state cases and
the rate at which new cases are filed.
All of the above mentioned have seemed to warrant renewed serious reconsideration
of the existing ISDS system. In recent years, China's rise and displayed willingness to
participate in reforms of existing international economic orders seem to have offered new
opportunities to revive the old discussion. The newly concluded investment chapter of CEPA
presents us with a carefully designed bilateral system that attempts to internalize conflicts by
See Lise Johnson & Brooke Skartvedt Guven, The Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Discussion of
Democratic Accountability and the Public Interest, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS (Mar. 13, 2017),
http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/03/ITN-The-Settlement-of-Investment-Disputes-Mar-13-2017.pdf.
163

165

Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited (British Hong Kong) v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID

Case No. ARB/83/4 (May 20, 1992), awardrendered, 8 ICSID Rev. FILJ 328 (1993).
166 Mediation ofInvestor-State Conflicts, 127 HARv. L. REV. 2558 (2014).
167
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the combined use of negotiation, mediation, and domestic court, as well as a slow moving
away from the classical investor-state arbitration model.
CEPA's inclusion of an
independent, stand-alone mediation mechanism should be seen as China's pragmatic response
to the ISDS legitimacy crisis, offering a form of reform that is both milder than the European
proposal of a permanent investment court, and less ambiguous than the American gradual
progression model.
Although currently this mechanism is solely restricted to the free trade agreement
between mainland China and its two Special Administrative Regions, as some Chinese
scholar predicted, it is not unforeseeable to see China promotes the adoption of similar
dispute settlement mechanism in its trade agreement talks with countries included in its Belt
and Road Initiatives.16 8
Admittedly, the future of CEPA's investor-mediation mechanism will be partly
dependent on the frequency with which this system is invoked. Primarily, the quality of
mediation professionals needs to be carefully monitored. As the CEPA mediator recruitment
processes commences, the quality of those enlisted to serve remains a critical element. Poor
early experiences may have lasting negative effects, causing cost-sensitive disputants to shun
conciliation in favor of the familiar, if imperfect, direct compliant or court mechanism. By
contrast, where conciliators enjoy adeptness and authoritativeness equal to that of the
arbitrators who regularly handle such disputes, the inherent strengths of conciliation relative
to arbitration will grow. However, since transparency of the current system is lacking 6 9, it
might be helpful for legislators to keep the community abreast with the user records, which
will well reflect how likely future disputants are going to invoke this mechanism.
V.

CONCLUSION

As a rather active participant of international political and economic affairs, China
has always been concerned with the fact that the design of the current ISDS mechanism was
centered on interests of last generation capital exporting countries trying to reap benefits
derived from trade deficit of overseas investment. Although in short term, it is not
foreseeable that China will completely move away from the ISDS, the country is at a position
to advocate for more active use of non-adjudicative and interest-based methods such as
mediation. Non adjudicative methods, when designed property, could well complement
investor-state arbitration and other procedurally more formal means, adding China's
confidence in the investor-state dispute settlement system.
Although China has accelerated its judicial reforms by establishing international
commercial courts in cities such as Xi'an and Shenzhen and by selecting highly qualified
Chinese judges to hear disputes in these judicial forums, concern as to the impartiality of
these entirely state-run programs remain. 170 It is unlikely that investors flood into these
forums for dispute resolutions without seeing one or two solid examples of investors' success.
Bearing that in mind, mediation as a dispute settlement mechanism might seem fairer to
investors from China's major trade partners, especially those from less developed countries.
From this perspective, the design of an investor-state mediation mechanism can be practically

1
Jingxia Shi & Nuan Dong, The Construction of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism under the
"Belt andRoad" Initiative, WUHAN INT'L L. REV. (June 2018).
169 Coe, supra note 20.
170 Shi & Dong, supra note 168.
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tailored to suit the needs of China's position as both a capital exporting and capital importing
state, responding to the prevalent ISDS legitimacy crisis in a China-centric pragmatic manner.
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